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Recent court cases have extended legal protection to transgender
1
 employees for the first 
time.
2
 While this would seem to be a revolutionary shift in legal interpretation, the actual impact 
of the decisions on the lives and experiences of transgender employees will be much more 
limited. Legal protection will be limited by sex-specific grooming codes and medical gate-
keeping, such that the recent changes will only provide protection to those transgender persons 
whose gender identity reaffirms, rather than challenges, society’s traditional, binary conceptions 
of “masculine” and “feminine.”  
Our understanding of sex and gender in society and in the law has changed greatly since 
sex discrimination in employment was first outlawed by Congress in the form of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
3
 To accurately consider and analyze the impact of sex discrimination in 
the law and in the workplace, we must begin with an understanding of what “sex” and “gender” 
are and how they are created. Feminist and queer theory provide a solid background on which to 
                                                        
1
 For a useful resource on terminology, See Transgender Terminology, National Center for Transgender Equality, 
found at http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_TransTerminology.pdf. For my purposes here, it is useful to 
define a few. Transgender is an umbrella term for people whose gender identity, expression, or behavior is different 
from those typically associated with their assigned sex at birth, including but not limited to transsexuals, cross-
dressers, androgynous people, gender-queers, and gender non-conforming people. Transsexual, often used in cases 
referenced here, is more specific, referring to people whose gender identity is different from their assigned sex at 
birth, and who often wish to alter their bodies through hormones or surgery in order to make it match their gender 
identity.  
Cisgender refers to someone whose gender identity does match their assigned gender at birth. Throughout, I prefer 
to use the more inclusive term “transgender” but use other terms when in reference to specific cases as used by the 
court.  
2
 See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp.2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821.  
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1981). 
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situate and understand sex and gender as socially constructed and performative,
4
 and as a method 
of assigning social value and power in a hierarchy, with hegemonic masculinity at the top.
5
 Any 
deviance from this masculine ideal is punished.
6
 While this includes more commonly recognized 
forms of discrimination, such as discrimination against women, it also shows many other acts of 
discrimination, such as that against gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees, that against 
transgender employees, and that against even male employees who are not perceived to be 
masculine enough, are all interrelated and perpetrated with the same motivation.
7
 Without this 
understanding, we would be unable to accurately understand the causes of sex discrimination, 
and likewise unable to interpret Title VII in ways to actually achieve the remedial goal of the 
statute; elimination of all employment discrimination “because of […] sex.”
8
  
By considering the shift in court interpretation from the Gender Stereotyping approach to 
the new Categorical Inclusion approach, the similarities and differences between them become 
more apparent. Section II will trace the history and evolution of these approaches and detail the 
advantages of Categorical Inclusion over Gender Stereotyping.  Section III highlights the three 
continuing problems, and the particular dangers of Categorical Inclusion. These are sex-specific 
grooming codes and medical gate-keeping. Then, Section IV will show how deep-seated beliefs 
about proper levels of employer/societal control over gender performance transform what seems 
to be the explicit, categorical inclusion of protection for transgender employees into an approach 
more accurately labeled “Category Neutrality,” an interpretation characterized not by protection 
                                                        
4
 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004); Judith 
Butler, Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics, Revista de Antropologia Iberoamericana, 4, No. 3, 1-13 
(2009).  
5
 See Ann McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 1151 (2008); Ann McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment 






 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1981). 
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of gender nonconformity, but by the ability to choose which category you will conform to. 
Category Neutrality will provide no protection outside of binary gender performances and will 
then serve to reinforce and mandate such performances of gender by employees, cisgender and 
transgender alike.  
Finally, Section V will conclude, framing this process as one of “preservation through 
transformation.” This type of seemingly large charge is often subject to societal impulses to limit 
the change as much as possible, and to even repurpose the change to reaffirm the status quo. 
Here, court cases that seem to create Categorical Inclusion have actually created a regime of 
Category Neutrality, which uses sex-specific grooming codes and medical gate-keeping to limit 
protection to only those employees who practice binary performances of gender and will 
reinforce binary gender performances on all employees, trans and cisgender alike. This will only 
continue and reaffirm society’s patriarchal norms, devaluing women, the feminine, anyone 
stepping outside of binary gender norms, and those who challenge the naturalness of those 
norms. Those who fit into a binary system of gender will be privileged over those who do not, 
who become invisible under the law.  
II. Shifting from a Gender Stereotyping Approach to Categorical Inclusion (Sort of) 
To understand how courts interpret Title VII in cases involving transgender plaintiffs, it 
is useful to see how this interpretation has changed over time. There are three distinct 
interpretations that have been utilized by courts to understand these cases, each occupying what 
seems to be a distinct chronological period of time, Categorical Rejection, Gender Stereotyping, 
and Categorical Inclusion.
9
 This Section will trace the history and evolution of the two most 
                                                        
9
 This categorization is my own, but other similar formulations are offered by Kim Yuracko and Jason Lee. See Kim 
Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757 (2012); Jason Lee, 
Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 
Harv. J. L. & Gender 423 (2012). 
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recent approaches in depth, Gender Stereotyping and Categorical Inclusion, and will conclude 
with a look at the advantages of Categorical Inclusion over Gender Stereotyping.  
Transgender plaintiffs first began to find success after the Supreme Court’s 1989 Price 
Waterhouse decision.
10
 Prior to then, very few cases were brought by transgender plaintiffs and 
all were ultimately unsuccessful.
11
 This stage was characterized by the categorical rejection of 
claims by transgender plaintiffs.
12
 The courts considered the plaintiffs to be members of a “new” 
category, transsexuals, one that was not protected under Title VII.
13
  
In the years following the Price Waterhouse decision, most circuit courts have reconciled 
their resistance to adding “transsexual” as a “new” category meriting protection with Price 
Waterhouse’s Gender Stereotyping theory by concluding that, while transgender plaintiffs are 
not protected as transgender, they are still entitled to the same protection they would have as a 
cisgender, nonconforming plaintiff.
14
 “There is nothing in existing case law setting a point at 
which a man becomes too effeminate, or a woman becomes too masculine, to warrant 
protection.”
15
 If they can prove that their discrimination was based on gender stereotypes, they 
can be successful under Title VII.
16
 This had the potential to dramatically change Title VII, but 
has been limited by courts’ normative belief that there is an acceptable level of enforced gender 
conformity and their belief that homosexuality and transgender identities are not inherently 
                                                        
10
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
11
 See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 
659; Summers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
12




 See Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d 653 (S.D. Texas 2008); Smith v. City 
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Tronetti v. TLC 
Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., 2003 WL 22757935. 
15
 Lopez, supra note 39, at 660. 
16
 Supra note 14.  
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gender nonconforming, such that evidence of homophobia and transphobia do not constitute 
evidence of gender stereotyping.
17
  
The third, emerging stage has recognized that, as currently understood by society, 
transgender identities are inherently nonconforming.
18
 Recognition that homosexuality is 
considered inherently gender nonconforming seems to be imminent.
19
 In addition to better 
understanding how sex discrimination operates in society, this approach provides several 
distinct, practical benefits in regards to pleading, sex-segregated facilities, and evidence.  
a. The Predominant Interpretation: Gender Stereotyping 
The second stage, which was triggered by the Supreme Court’s unexpectedly 
revolutionary decision in Price Waterhouse,
20
 came to be characterized by a reconciliation 
between the realization that Title VII needed to include “gender stereotyping”
21
 to be successful 
in its remedial goal of eliminating sex discrimination and the resistance of courts to consider 




                                                        
17
 See Joel Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 Duke 
J. Gender L. & Pol’y 205, 218-219 (2007). 
18
 Supra note 2.  
19
 For arguments in favor of expanding protection to cover sexual orientation, see Andrew Koppelman, Why 
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994) and Olivia 
Szwalbnest, Discriminating Because of “Pizzazz”: Why Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation Evidences 
Sexual Discrimination Under the Sex-Stereotyping Doctrine of Title VII, 20 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (2010).  For a 
case that comes right up to the line without explicitly providing coverage for sexual orientation, see Centola v. 
Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 403 (D. Mass 2002). 
20
 Price Waterhouse, supra note 10.  
21
 Id. at 251. 
22
 See Rivera v. HFS Corp., 2012 WL 2152072 (D. PR 2012) (finding that calling plaintiff a “dirty dyke” was 
insufficient to show gender stereotyping and that gender stereotyping should not be used to “bootstrap” protection 
for sexual orientation); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“This theory would not bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII”); Kiley v. American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 
Fed.Appx. 107 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“a plaintiff may not use a gender stereotyping claim to bootstrap protection for 
sexual orientation into Title VII”); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F.Supp. 284 (E.D. PA 1993) 
(“Congress did not intend Title VII to protect transsexuals on the basis of their transsexualism”). 
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Price Waterhouse first outlined a sex discrimination claim based on sex (or gender) 
stereotyping in 1989.
23
 Though not considered an important issue at the time, this has been one 
of the most significant precedents set by the case.
24
 Using a Gender Stereotyping theory of 
liability, plaintiffs can show that they had been discriminated against, based not just on their sex, 
but based specifically on the perception that they were violating gender stereotypes.
25
 Prior to 
Price Waterhouse, a claim of sex discrimination was generally interpreted as requiring that an 
adverse employment action be made “because of sex,” in the sense that it was based on animus 
towards one gender, and preference for the other, or because an individual was assumed to fulfill 
a negative stereotype rather than for violating one (ex. women do not have the strength to be 
police officers).
26
 A Gender Stereotyping theory allows sex discrimination to be shown when the 
adverse employment action is made because the individual is perceived as violating gender 
stereotypes.
27
 Under this theory, if an employer does not discriminate against all women, but 
does discriminate against women (or a woman) perceived as too masculine, this would now be 
sufficient to show sex discrimination.
28
 Likewise, a man who is discriminated against for being 
perceived as too feminine can also show sex discrimination.
29
  
Despite the broad, inclusive language, there is not agreement that the holding of Price 
Waterhouse is really that broad. While the court felt that it was unfair discrimination for a 
successful woman to be denied partnership for the very masculine qualities that made her so 
                                                        
23
 Courts generally use sex and gender interchangeably, but based on the analysis, it would be better described as 
“gender” stereotyping, since it addresses stereotypes of gendered behavior, not biological characteristics. 
24
 The other main issue addressed in Price Waterhouse, the establishment of the mixed-motive claim, has been 
altered by amendment to Title VII in 1991. Supra, note 10.  
25
 Id. at 251. 
26
 Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 561 (2007) at 
573. 
27




 Id. at 251. 
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successful, it is not as clear that absent this sort of catch 22, there should be protection.
30
 This 
disagreement over the boundaries of Price Waterhouse (or perhaps just resistance to the 
implications of it) has led courts in various directions, but most have ultimately headed towards 
at least some protection for LGBT employees.  
Smith v. City of Salem is a good example of this reconciliation.
31
 In this case, Smith 
brought a claim against her employer for sex discrimination based on Gender Stereotyping and 
because of her identification as a transsexual.
32
 Smith was diagnosed with Gender Identity 
Disorder (GID) and began presenting at work as a woman.
33
 Following this, Smith’s co-workers 
began commenting that her appearance was “not masculine enough”
34
 and her employer 
subjected her to psychological evaluations before ultimately suspending her.
35
 The Sixth Circuit 
found in her favor, clarifying that someone’s transgender status is not fatal to an otherwise 
successful claim of sex discrimination, as shown through Gender Stereotyping.
36
 Gender identity 
is not covered, but people who are transgender are likewise not excluded from the same 
protections that cisgender employees have, from being discriminated against for failing to 
conform to gender stereotypes.
37
  
Cases such as this, involving homosexual or transgender plaintiffs, show the implicit 
limitations of Price Waterhouse. Although they aim to apply a Gender Stereotyping theory to 
homosexual and transgender plaintiffs in the same way they would to a heterosexual, cisgender 




 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). See e.g. Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, 
Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d 653 (S.D. Texas 2008); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Tronetti v. 
TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., 2003 WL 22757935; Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1585257 (W.D. 
MO 2000); Creed v. Family Express Corp., 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. IN 2009).  
32
 Smith, supra, note 31, at 571. In Smith, the court uses male pronouns, identifying her as a man who is violating 
male stereotypes by identifying and acting contrary to that masculine identity. However, I refer to Smith by female 
pronouns because she identifies as a woman.  
33




 Id. at 569. 
36
 Id. at 575. 
37
 Id.  
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plaintiff, courts still see “homosexual” and “transgender/transexual” as additional, unprotected 
categories, rather than recognizing sexuality and gender as something that all people have, but 
which can be performed in conforming or nonconforming ways. Therefore, the courts do not 
categorize homosexuality or transgender identity as inherently nonconforming.
38
 Hence, there 
must be additional evidence that the discrimination was based on gender stereotypes, exclusive 
of any evidence that it seems based on homosexuality or gender identity.
39
 This understanding of 
gender and sexuality fails to see the connections between them, as well as the connection 
between discrimination based on sex or gender, that based on sexual orientation, and that based 
on gender identity. In reality, these are all connected, working together to devalue the feminine, 
whether found in men or women, and to punish any nonconformance.  
b. A New Interpretation: Categorical Inclusion (Sort Of) 
What could be identified as the third stage has emerged slowly and quietly over the last 
few years. The first example, Schroer v. Billington,
40
 was decided in 2008, but did not reach the 
circuit level, limiting its precedential value. Glenn v. Brumby
41
, decided by the Eleventh Circuit, 
was decided in 2011, and is the closest to Categorical Inclusion a circuit court has come. The 
final case, Macy v. Holder
42
, decided in 2012, also has limited precedential value because it is an 
administrative decision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and binding 
only on the federal government, but potentially setting a persuasive standard.
43
  
                                                        
38
 Supra note 22.  
39
 Id. For example, in Simonton, supra note 22, at 38, the court notes that “[t]his theory would not bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not 
all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.” While this is surely true, it refuses to address the reality that the 
individual’s homosexuality itself may be considered nonconforming (even where he conforms otherwise to 
masculine stereotypes/she conforms to feminine stereotypes).  
40
 Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp.2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
41
 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
42
 Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821.  
43
 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Sector, found at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/index.cfm.  
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These cases have all gone further than those from the second stage, by identifying 
discrimination based on gender identity as inherently about gender nonconformance
44
 or by 
categorically including discrimination based on gender identity as sex discrimination.
45
 This 
presents the possibility of broad protection for all gender nonconformity, but like in the first and 
second stage, will ultimately be constrained by deep societal beliefs about reasonable 
enforcement of gender performance. 
Schroer v. Billington addressed the rescinding of an offer of employment to Diane 
Schroer,
46
 who applied to be a terrorism specialist at the Library of Congress under what had 
been her legal name at the time, David Shroer.
47
 She was highly favored over the other 
candidates, having retired as a Colonel after twenty-five years of service in the U.S. Armed 
Forces followed by work at a private consulting firm.
48
 She earned the highest interview score 
and was recommended unanimously by the selection committee.
49
 A job offer was made, but it 




The court found both that she could make a Gender Stereotyping claim,
51
 and that a claim 
based on discrimination because someone planned to “undergo[…] sex reassignment … is 
literally discrimination because of … sex,” regardless of evidence about stereotypes.
52
 As to the 
Gender Stereotyping claim, the court found that there was compelling, direct evidence that the 
                                                        
44
 Brumby, supra note 41, at 1316.  
45
 Schroer, supra note 40, at 306-307, and Macy, supra note 42, at 10-11. 
46
 Supra note 40 at 299. 
47




 Id. at 296. 
50
 Id. at 295-299. 
51
 Id. at 305. 
52
 Id. at 308. Italics in original. 
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defendant’s decision was based on sex stereotypes.
53
 The defendant admitted that she saw 
Schroer as “a man in women’s clothing.”
54
 The court ultimately concluded that it did not matter 
“for purposes of Title VII liability whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because 
it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or 
an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.”
55
 There was no need to differentiate, because 
they are all based on gender stereotypes.
56
 Unlike many cases, the court here recognizes both that 
these categories are connected, and that discrimination based on any one of them comes out of 
the same desire – to punish nonconformity, whether performed by a trans or cisgendered person.  
As to the other argument, that discrimination based on gender transition is, regardless of 
direct evidence of stereotyping, sex discrimination, the court again found in the plaintiff’s 
favor.
57
 Making an analogy to discrimination based on religion that would later be quoted by the 
Macy decision, the judge argued that an employee changing their sex should be compared with 
an employee changing their religion. If an employer discriminated against an employee after she 
converted from Christianity to Judaism, but harbored no bias towards Christians or Jews 
generally, we would have no difficulty defining this as discrimination based on religion. Where 
one is discriminated against based on a change of religion, we would recognize that that is still 
“because of religion,” and likewise, where one is discriminated against because they are 
changing their sex, this is still clearly “because of sex.”
58
 The creation of a new category, 
whether “converts” or “transsexual/gender” is an inappropriate way to avoid protection based on 
religion or gender. This understanding better recognizes that gender identity is something that 
                                                        
53








 Id. at 306. 
58
 Id. at 306-307. 
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everyone has, whether cisgender or transgender. Everyone has a gender, but society only 
disapproves of some gender presentations.  
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit decided Glenn v. Brumby, brought by the plaintiff following 
her termination from employment with the state of Georgia.
59
 Glenn had worked with the 
Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel since 2005.
60
 In 2007, when Glenn 
informed her supervisor that she would start presenting as a woman at work, she was fired.
61
 She 
was told that her “transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some people 
would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make Glenn’s coworkers uncomfortable.”
62
  
In response, Glenn sued her former employer, alleging that Brumby had discriminated 
against her based on sex, including her gender identity and her failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes.
63
 The court first considered whether firing an employee based on their failure to 
comply with gender stereotypes is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
64
 To find an equal 
protection violation, one must belong to a suspect class (such as gender or race) that has been 
                                                        
59
 Brumby, supra note 41, at 1313. 
60






 Id. Because her employer was an arm of the state, she had more legal options than are usually available in cases of 
employment discrimination. Most are brought under Title VII, but where there is state action, a discriminatory 
action can also constitute a constitutional violation, under the Equal Protection Clause. “In a § 1983 action, a court 
must determine ‘whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.”’ Id. 
(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)). Section 1983 is a statutory vehicle for addressing the 
“deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). When an Equal 
Protection Clause claim is brought to challenge the same type of employer conduct that can be remedied by Title 
VII, the same framework is used to analyze both types of cases. Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2nd Cir. 
2006) (holding that once color of law is established, the analysis for a § 1983 claim is similar to an employment 
discrimination claim under Title VII, except that a § 1983 claim can be brought against an individual); Stuart v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 152 F.Appx 798, 802 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that when § 1983 is a 
parallel remedy to Title VII, the elements are the same); Wright v. Rolette Cnty., 417 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(stating the elements of a prima facie case are the same regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks relief under a Title 
VII or § 1983 claim); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) (pointing out that Title VII and § 1983 
“coexist to afford relief for employment discrimination” and the standards are the same for litigation under both); 
Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) (using the same precedent developed under Title VII to 
analyze a § 1983 claim); Klen v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., No. CIVA05CV02452EWNCBS, 2007 WL 2022061, at 
19 (D. Colo. July 9, 2007). 
64
 Brumby, supra note 41, at 1315. 
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discriminated against.
65
 Unlike Title VII, there is no list of protected classes, and different 
classes trigger different levels of protection.
66
 However, sex is considered a suspect class that 
triggers heightened scrutiny.
67
 Instead of determining if being transgender is a suspect class on 
its own, the court considered whether gender identity fits within “sex” as protected, and decided 
that it did.
68
 Walking a fine line between the Gender Stereotyping approach and a Categorical 
Inclusion approach, the court said that when a transgender employee is fired because of his or 
her gender non-conformity, the government violates the Equal Protection Clause.
69
 However, 
while this sounds like traditional Gender Stereotyping theory following Price Waterhouse, the 
court then acknowledged that a person is defined as transgender precisely because they are 
perceived as violating gender stereotypes.
70
 There is thus “a congruence between discriminating 
against transgender and transsexual individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based 
behavioral norms.”
71
 This successfully identifies the reason why trans people are discriminated 
against – it is because their identities challenge society’s gender norms.  
The court then applied this legal interpretation to Glenn’s case.
72
 The defendant testified 
that he considered it “inappropriate”
73
 for her to be dressed as a woman, that he found it 
“unnatural,”
74
 and that his decision to fire her was based on “the sheer fact of the transition.”
75
 
Based on this direct evidence, the court determined that “[i[f this were a Title VII case, the 
                                                        
65




 Brumby, supra note 41, at 1315-1316. 
68














 Id. at 1321. 
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analysis would end here.”
76
 Glenn would thus have successfully won a Title VII claim, but since 
this was brought as an Equal Protection Clause claim, there was one more step in the analysis.
77
 
If Brumby had an “exceedingly persuasive justification” based on a “sufficiently important 
government interest” for the discriminating conduct, her firing would not be an equal protection 
violation.
78
 Brumby alleged that their reason was concern that other women would object to 
Glenn’s use of the women’s restroom.
79
 However, because this claim was contradicted by the 
evidence and was wholly based on speculation, the court did not find this reason sufficient to 
withstand heightened scrutiny.
80
 Glenn was thus still successful even with the extra hurdle of an 
Equal Protection Clause claim.   
The most recent case is Macy v. Holder, an EEOC administrative decision, binding only 
on the federal government with respect to its own employees.
81
 The plaintiff applied for a 
position with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives at a crime laboratory.
82
 
At the time, she still presented publically as a man.
83
 After phone conversations with the director 
of the lab, she was told that the job was hers pending completion of a background check.
84
 While 
waiting to hear the results of the background check, Macy informed them that she was in the 
process of transitioning from male to female.
85
 Five days later, Macy was informed that the 
position was no longer available.
86
 










 Id. However, it is worth noting that this leaves the door open for the possibility that where there was evidence of 
complaints, the employer would have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the firing of a transgender 
employee.  
81
 Macy, supra note 42.  
82




 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 Id.  
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Macy filed a formal complaint, describing her claim as based on sex, gender identity, and 
sex stereotyping.
87
 In analyzing her claim, the EEOC noted that the interpretation of sex under 
Title VII was becoming increasingly more inclusive of gender identity, and concluded that they 
must likewise open up sex discrimination to include transgender plaintiffs.
88
 While it could be 
easily argued that they somewhat overstate their case here, ignoring other precedent to the 
contrary and interpreting Smith v. City of Salem very broadly,
89
 they did correctly identify an 
ongoing sea change in courts’ responses to transgender plaintiffs, though it may not be as 
unanimous as they imply.
90
 They then considered the plain language of Title VII and the analogy 
suggested by the court in Schroer v. Billington.
91
 By comparing someone changing their sex to 
someone converting from one religion to another, they argue that even the plain language must 
include discrimination based on gender identity, regardless of the precedent in favor of it.
92
 On 
this basis, the EEOC determined that discrimination based on someone’s transgender status is 
per se sex discrimination, and expressly overruled prior decisions to the contrary.
93
 This 
expansion acknowledges the connection between discrimination based on sex and discrimination 
based on gender identity. By expanding coverage to include gender identity, the EEOC creates 
the possibility of better effectuating the remedial goal of Title VII. If our goal is to eliminate 
discrimination based on sex and gender, we must include protection for all gender performances, 
even those that challenge societal beliefs.  
                                                        
87
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c. Advantages Over the Gender Stereotyping Approach 
There are several advantages to the categorical approach for transgender employees that 
are relevant to consider. Firstly, there will be less possibility that an improper pleading will get 
the case tossed out. Under the Gender Stereotyping approach, where it is important to distinguish 
between covered gender nonconformity and unprotected gender identity, the way that the case is 
pled is very important.
94
 While this is less of a problem for transgender plaintiffs than it is for 
homosexual plaintiffs,
95
 it can present problems. For example, Macy originally pled that she was 
discriminated against based on both sex and gender identity, and her claim based on gender 
identity was dismissed.
96
 To force the EEOC to address the issue of gender identity, she 
withdrew the sex discrimination claim and appealed on gender identity.
97
 In her case the strategy 
worked, but most courts would reject a claim based only on gender identity without a second 
thought.
98
 If lucky, the court will allow a plaintiff to amend their complaint.
99
 The best strategy 
is to plead both sex and gender identity, but this is not always done, possibly because of 
unfamiliarity with the law, or because of strong feelings on the part of the plaintiff about how 
they understand the discrimination they experienced. Regardless, valid claims should not be 
dismissed because of a lack of clarity, and including gender identity as a category protected 
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under Title VII creates clarity as to what is covered under Title VII and ensures that all claims 
brought by transgender plaintiffs will be considered equally before the court.  
Secondly, it may provide more protection for transgender plaintiffs who are terminated 
due to issues surrounding use of sex-segregated facilities. Restroom usage has been a persistent 
problem for transgender employees.
100
 Employers often require transgender employees to use the 
facilities for a gender that they do not identify with, often based on supposed fears about the 
reactions of other employees.
101
 When employees are terminated for failure to follow these 
policies, courts have been unsympathetic, often determining that this concern constitutes a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.
102
 With Categorical Inclusion, it would 
be a more difficult argument for an employer to make because it would be clear that only 
transgender employees would be fired in such a situation. With transgender status explicitly 
protected, usage of facilities consistent with gender identity would also be protected. This is an 
important change, due to the persistent problems faced by the trans community in regards to 
bathroom usage.  
Thirdly, it will expand the evidence that can be used to demonstrate discrimination 
against a transgender plaintiff. Under the Gender Stereotyping approach, only very specific 
factual scenarios can find success in the courtroom. These factual scenarios are limited to 
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explicit comments about what is appropriate for men or for women.
103
 It is not enough to argue 
that certain harassment or conduct is based on stereotypes. The discriminating supervisor or 
harasser must specifically and explicitly invoke the stereotype.
104
 This creates a situation in 
which very similar treatment may be completely protected or completely unprotected. For 
example, if an employer regularly promoted other, less qualified employees over a transgender 
woman, and the supervisor included comments on her yearly reviews about how it is unnatural 
for a man to dress in feminine attire and is thus not projecting the right image for the company, 
she would likely find protection under Title VII. On the other hand, if the comments said that the 
employee found transgender status to be unnatural, and contrary to the image the company 
wanted to project, she would not find protection under Title VII through a Gender Stereotyping 
theory. The scenarios are almost identical, and both are certainly motivated by the same animus; 
punishing gender nonconformance that fails to reinforce proper boundaries between the 
masculine and the feminine and the naturalness of those boundaries. The only difference is the 
specific language used. Under a categorical approach, however, both would clearly be protected 
under Title VII.  
The other implicit problem with requiring specific language that directly invokes a 
gender stereotype is that it essentially requires direct evidence. Most employment discrimination 
cases, however, are based on indirect evidence that creates an inference of discrimination,
105
 
such as firing a woman and replacing her with a man. Determining whether discrimination was 
based on gender stereotyping and not gender identity cannot be done without direct evidence, 
because the determination is so fact-specific. This means that cases brought by transgender 
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plaintiffs will always be more difficult to win under a Gender Stereotyping theory and will get 
harder as time goes on. Because there is less societal consensus that discrimination based on 
gender identity is wrong, people are more likely to verbalize their animus. As society changes, 
this will become less and less common, and discrimination will get harder and harder to prove, 
because it is almost impossible to indirectly prove discrimination against a transgender employee 
using a Gender Stereotyping theory. Having gender identity categorically included will allow 
transgender employees to have the same ability to prove discrimination indirectly as cisgender 
employees.  
There are thus clear, practical benefits to a Categorical Inclusion approach over a Gender 
Stereotyping approach. There are people who would not have been able to successfully find 
relief from discrimination under a Gender Stereotyping approach, but who are able to under the 
Categorical Inclusion of gender identity. It also seems to better understand the causes of 
discrimination based on gender identity and its overlap with discrimination based on sex, by 
recognizing that they cannot be separated. Potentially the most important step made by the 
categorical approach is the implicit statement that discrimination based on gender identity is just 
as much of a problem as other forms of discrimination, and thus deserving of protection. This 
acknowledgement is an important step to true gender equality. 
III. Continuing Problems 
However, there are still considerable problems that continue or even worsen under a 
Categorical Inclusion approach. These problems create substantial gaps in protection, and will 
make the Categorical Inclusion approach only minimally effective at eliminating gender 
discrimination. Each of these problems, sex-specific grooming codes and medical gate-keeping, 
will be considered individually. What they all have in common that that they all provide 
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protection to some trans people, and to certain types of gender nonconformance, while excluding 
others from protection.  
a. Sex-Specific Grooming Codes 
A key problem that is unaddressed by any of the cases that have held gender identity to 
be categorically included among the protected classes in Title VII, is the problem of sex-specific 
grooming codes.
106
 This is an area that has always suggested the courts’ discomfort with the 
implications of the Gender Stereotyping theory.
107
 The silence of the courts in this area
108
 leads 
to only one conclusion: that the categorical approach does nothing to overturn the longstanding 
precedent on sex-specific grooming codes.  
A recent, well-known example is Jespersen v. Harrah’s, where the Ninth Circuit made 
clear that Price Waterhouse did not prohibit employers from instituting sex-specific grooming 
codes.
109
 In the case, a female bartender was fired after failing to conform to the company’s new 
dress code.
110
 This dress code had separate rules for men and for women. While the uniform 
itself was the same for men and women, women were required to wear makeup, while men were 
prohibited from wearing makeup.
111
 Women were also required to have their hair teased, curled, 
or styled, and men were required to keep their hair short.
112
 While the plaintiff here was 
cisgender and identified as a woman, she did not conform to her employer’s definition of what a 
woman should be. She felt very strongly that the makeup requirements conflicted with her self-
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identity, that the requirement was offensive, and that it made her so uncomfortable that it 
interfered with her ability to do her job.
113
  
Firing someone for not following a rule that only applies to women (that they must wear 
makeup) would seem to clearly violate any formulation of sex discrimination, because it is 
explicit that a woman is being fired for something that would not result in her firing had she been 
a man. It could be argued that the relevant comparison is whether a man would be fired for a 
violation of the grooming code (rather than for not wearing makeup), but following Price 
Waterhouse it seems clear that a rule created to enforce a gender stereotype – that women look a 
certain way – is a violation of Title VII. However, instead of following what seems to be clear 
precedent, the court set out a separate rule for sex-specific dress and grooming codes.
114
 They 
decided that it is only a violation where the rule presents a “greater burden on one sex than the 
other.”
115
 As this is clearly contrary to the rest of the case law, it strongly suggests that the court 
felt, based on their own non-legal convictions, that it was reasonable to have sex-specific 
grooming codes. Here, where there were rules for both sexes and insufficient evidence had been 
presented that the women’s rules were any more onerous than the men’s rules, the court found 




This resistance to see discrimination when there is a requirement on both men and 
women fails to understand gender properly. If discrimination is only exhibiting a preference for 
one gender over the other, then this is logical. However, a more complex understanding of 








 Id. at 1083. 
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gender directs us to recognize the way in which restrictions and gender policing on both/all 
genders hurt the individual “based on sex.”  
Considering this case in light of the new Categorical Inclusion approach to include 
discrimination based on gender identity suggests little change. For Jespersen herself, it provides 
no additional protection. She was not transgender and was not perceived as such. She violated 
gender stereotypes in a more limited way. She identified as a woman, but her gender 
performance did not match what was expected by her employer. In this way, the new 
interpretation does not change the outcome of this case. If we imagine a similar situation, where 
a sex-specific grooming code is violated, but by a transgender employee, the outcome still does 
not change. If we held transgender women to the same grooming code, some of them would be 
comfortable with the makeup requirement, and would comply. Others would run into the same 
problem that Jespersen did. A transgender woman with a more butch gender presentation might 
have similar feelings to the makeup requirement as Jespersen. If protection is available from 
discrimination based on gender identity, it would be illegal for the employer to force such a 
transgender woman to comply with the men’s grooming code, based on their assumption that 
that was her “actual” or “real” gender. However, it would not give any greater protection from 
the women’s grooming code (or the men’s grooming code for a transman). She can choose to 
identify as a woman and have that decision protected, but can still be legally expected to 
conform to the employer’s definition of what it means to be a woman.  
This result is also suggested by the guidance provided by the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) on treatment of transgender employees in the federal government.
117
 This 
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guidance does not address legal rights, but seeks to provide guidelines for equitable treatment of 
transgender employees.
118
 However, following the EEOC decision in Macy, this guidance has 
been promoted by the EEOC as consistent with Macy and as instructive in complying with Macy 
going forward.
119
 This guidance specifically addresses grooming codes. They “should be applied 
to employees transitioning to a different gender in the same way that they are applied to other 
employees of that gender… [d]ress codes should not be used to prevent a transgender employee 
from living full-time in the role consistent with his or her gender identity.”
120
 This is completely 
consistent with the above analysis; a transgender employee cannot be forced to follow the code 
for a gender they do not identify with, but they will be forced to conform to the one that they do. 
In this way, burdensome requirements that reinforce and mandate specified gender performances 
are acceptable so long as they are equally discriminatory.  
Transgender and cisgender employees alike can thus both still be required to adopt the 
gender performances mandated by an employer’s sex-specific grooming code, so long as it is not 
considered to be putting an undue burden on one sex. This is considered to be consistent with 




b. Medical Gate-Keeping 
A second problem that is not addressed or changed by the Categorical Inclusion of gender 
identity is that of medical gate-keeping. This problem is well established in the Gender 
Stereotyping approach
122
 and will in fact worsen under a categorical approach.  
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Dean Spade has comprehensively documented many areas of law where medical 
evidence is necessary to establish the gender identity of someone who is transgender.
123
 
Anywhere that trans-identity comes in contact with the law, medical evidence determines 
whether one has legally cognizable rights.
124
 This is the case in determining the legitimacy of a 
marriage, the custody of children, the right to wear gender appropriate clothing in school or 
foster care, rights in prison, or the right not to be discriminated against in employment.
125
 He 
identifies two main problems with medical gate-keeping. Firstly, because medical intervention is 
only available to those that can afford it, this means that legal recognition is realistically 
unavailable to most transgender people.
126
 Secondly, the medical care itself is doled out through 
gender-regulating processes that reinforce oppressive and sexist gender binaries.
127
 To get the 
sexual reassignment surgery that is necessary to be legally recognized as the gender that 
someone identifies with, they must convince doctors that they are “really” transsexual.
128
 To get 
through this process, transgender individuals must conform to hyper-masculine or hyper-
feminine characteristics.
129
 If they do not, they risk being considered just “confused,” and thus 
unable to get access to the medical intervention that determines their legal rights.
130
 This 
requirement of hyper-masculinity or -femininity requires not only current conformance, but also 
a history of gender nonconformance, preferably since childhood.
131
 This process is so difficult 
that those whose identity does not fit into this neat medical understanding are often driven to 
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lying to obtain the surgery they desire.
132
 This of course, does not even address people who do 
not desire surgery; this group would seem to be almost completely foreclosed from legal 
recognition. 
Spade’s analysis is consistent with both Gender Stereotyping cases and Categorical 
Inclusion cases, where medical evidence is used to legitimize the gender identity of the plaintiff. 
All of the Categorical Inclusion cases conform well to this unstated requirement of medical 
evidence. In Schroer v. Billington, Schroer had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder 
(GID) and was following a medically appropriate plan for transition, guided by the Harry 
Benjamin Standards of Care.
133
 The court took the time to include Schroer’s description of how 




In Glenn v. Brumby, we are told that Glenn has known she was a woman since puberty.
135
 
She was diagnosed with GID in 2005, and at that time began the process of transition under the 
supervision of health care providers.
136
 She began living as a woman outside of work, as a 
prerequisite to sexual reassignment surgery, and in 2007, was considered ready to proceed with 
surgery and live as a woman full time.
137
 Consistent with this, she had her name legally changed 
to match her gender identity.
138
  
 In Macy v. Holder, because the appeal only decides whether intentional discrimination 
against a transgender employee states a claim under Title VII and does not rule on the facts of 
                                                        
132
 Id. at 23. 
133
 Schroer, supra note 40, at 295. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association is now the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health, at www.wpath.org.  
134
 Id. at 296. 
135







The Legal Enforcement of “Proper” Gender Performance Through Title VII 25 
Macy’s claim, we do not have details about Macy’s compliance with medical protocols.
139
 
However, in analyzing the legal precedent, the EEOC looks to many cases, including Smith v. 
City of Salem, Glenn v. Brumby, and Schroer v. Billington.
140
 I have already addressed Brumby 
and Schroer in regards to their conformance with medical protocols. Smith v. City of Salem is 
similar, and the EEOC in Macy specifically references Smith’s medical history, noting that 
Smith had been diagnosed with GID and that she was acting according to the medical protocols 
for treatment of her GID.
141
  
Throughout all of these cases, we see medical evidence used to legitimize the gender 
identity of the plaintiffs. The fact that they were diagnosed with GID, per the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), that 
they were following a doctor’s plan consistent with WPATH, they wanted to live completely as 
women, including surgery and proper legal documentation (such as a driver’s license or other 
ID), and that they described their gender identity as something they had known for a long time, 
all go to create an understanding of their gender identity as real, scientifically verifiable, and 
immutable. For many transgender people, this is an accurate reflection of their experiences, but 
for many others, it is not.
142
 This medical gate-keeping only allows some gender nonconforming 
people access to legal recognition, and without legal recognition, they have no protection from 
discrimination in the workplace. In addition to the outright exclusion of protection to many 
gender nonconforming people, it is important what type of gender nonconformity is being 
privileged. By privileging those who conform to a binary understanding of gender, either male or 
female, even though it is not the gender society expected them to identity with, they do not 
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challenge the gender binary in the same way that a more fluid or otherwise non-binary 
performance of gender does. This is because making their identity cognizable through medical 
diagnosis frames them as “fixable.” By allowing them to transition, they are “fixed” and can 
begin life consistent with the preexisting gender performances available, rather than challenging 
them. In this way, transgender people’s bodies are repurposed to support the patriarchal 
insistence that gender and natural, innate, and predetermined.  
Particularly troublesome is that by offering categorical inclusion of gender identity, this 
problem will worsen. In a regime of protection specifically for people who are transsexual or 
transgender, courts will be forced to determine who qualifies as transsexual or transgender, and 
this medical evidence will become even more important to distinguish who is ‘entitled’ to legal 
protection and who is not.  
IV. Creation of “Category Neutrality” 
In addition to the gaps in protection left by these problems, court acceptance of sex-
specific grooming codes and medical gate-keeping, they work together to result in “Category 
Neutrality.”
143
 Category Neutrality is characterized not by acceptance of nonconformity, but by 
the ability to choose which category an individual will conform to.
144
 As such, while it offers 
some people the freedom to choose to live as the gender they identity with, it actually does 
nothing to expand the ability to live in ways that are considered gender nonconforming. Our 
perceptions as a society about proper gender performance will not only go unchallenged and 
unchanged, but will receive the force of law, mandating “proper” gender performance on the job. 
This law will even likely have extra legitimacy because of the appearance of coverage for 
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transgender employees. Transgender persons, despite having the potential to radically challenge 
our binary understanding of gender, will either continue to be unrecognizable under the law, in a 
state of increased precarity, or will be brought into the normative fold, reproducing binary 
performances of gender.  
a. No Protection Outside of Binary 
Category Neutrality does nothing to challenge binary performances of gender. While it 
has the potential to allow those who do not identity with the gender they were given at birth to 
transition to the other, it accepts these categories, completely unchanged. There are no options 
for nonconformity by transgender or cisgender employees. The result of this regime will be that 
only transgender persons that adhere to binary performances of gender will have legal protection. 
By basing protection on the individual’s conformance with the medical model of transexuality, 
one defined by hypermasculine and hyperfeminine models of gender,
145
 and allowing employers 
to enforce sex-specific grooming codes on their employees, those who do not conform to 
conventional notions of masculinity and femininity continue to lack protection from employment 
discrimination. Not only will this approach leave them unprotected, but it will also act to 
legitimize their exclusion from protection. 
Medical gate-keeping acts to define who is entitled to this protection. Those whose 
gender identity fits the medical model are able to present courts with something scientific, 
something ‘real,’ and something therefore seen as immutable to justify and explain their identity. 
Framing an identity as immutable makes courts much more sympathetic to their claims; Title VII 
has traditionally been viewed as a vehicle for protecting individuals from discrimination based 
on immutable characteristics, those that we cannot help, those that we were born with. This is 
key to courts’ desires to separate the immutable from mere ‘preference.’ In this way, medical 
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gate-keeping gives courts a way to determine what gender non-conformance is ‘real’ or 
‘immutable’ and what is merely preference, and thus unprotected. Any gender nonconformance 
that does not fit this model then, whether by a transgender or cisgender individual, is then merely 
preference, a voluntary act, not considered deserving of protection under Title VII.
146
  
While the medical community defines transsexuality very narrowly, the transgender 
community sees a much broader umbrella encompassing an infinite number of different ways 
one might understand their identity.
147
 While many cisgender and transgender people identify 
comfortably with an identifiably masculine or feminine gender identity, many do not.
148
 
Additionally, transgender persons who are not binary-identified are often the most vulnerable, 
because they are less likely to be perceived as “passing” by cisgender individuals.
149
 Any time 
that nonconformity is made visible, whether because someone’s gender performance is not 
identifiably male or female, because they are unable to obtain the surgery or hormones that 
would allow them to live fully in the gender they identify with, or just because their official 
identification does not match their gender presentation, they are exposed to greater possibilities 
for harassment and violence.
150
  
Finally, by offering protection for binary-identified trans people, the perpetuation of 
discrimination against those who are not binary-identified is not only continued, but legitimized. 
It might now be protected to be transgender, but only so long as you conform in every other way. 
By offering a route to protection however, conformance to binary gender norms, the law seems 
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neutral. They cannot be expected to protect those who ‘choose’ not to seek the protection of the 
law. The fact that this protection is realistically unavailable to many people is of no concern to 
the Category Neutral/Categorical Inclusion approach.  
b. Reinforcement of Masculine/Feminine Binary of Gender Performance 
By offering protection only to those who desire to fit into either a masculine or feminine 
binary gender performance and by defining what those performances look like, such as through 
grooming codes, the processes of the workplace and the law act together to reinforce these binary 
performances. For most adults, the workplace is the key site for socialization. The interactions 
that take place in the workplace, both between coworkers and between employees and employer, 
are highly important as spaces for the creation and performance of all aspects of identity, 
including gender. In this way, it becomes the key social institution impacting the gender 
performances of both transgender and cisgender adults. 
Sex-specific grooming codes are a good example of this problem, and one that is 
heightened under a Category Neutral regime. Where the discrimination (or burden) is felt by 
both men and women, courts have difficulty understanding it as “because of sex” because it is 
being applied to everyone.
151
 Indeed, the test of whether a grooming code constitutes sex 
discrimination is whether it creates an undue burden on one sex over the other.
152
 Such codes, 
however, have unparalleled power to define gendered expectations from the top down. The effect 
is that by defining limited performances for both genders, they can be discriminated against 
simultaneously. This occurs by putting the power of the organization behind the socially 
constructed gender performances. Hiring, firing, promotions and demotions, pay, and more, are 
strong motivations to conform to the expectations of the workplace, both implicit and explicit, 
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such as a sex-specific grooming code. While there are certainly reasonable and acceptable 
expectations made of employees in the workplace, an employer’s vision of proper gender 
performance is generally not going to be relevant to the proper functioning of a business or other 
employer. There are also other examples. Same-sex sexual harassment and “bisexual” 
harassment can both be effective but unofficial methods of reinforcing “proper” gendered 
behavior and performance, though they are beyond the scope of this paper.
153
 
A Category Neutrality regime will legitimize the use of sex-specific grooming codes and 
other methods of regulation of gender performances by employees in the workplace. This will 
result in the reinforcement of binary gender performances on men and women, cisgender and 
transgender employees alike.  
V. Conclusion: Preservation-Through-Transformation 
As courts move towards explicit coverage for gender identity/transgender persons, they 
will do so in such a way as to reaffirm, rather than challenge binary understandings of gender. 
This is due to the patriarchal system we are still a part of, serving to devalue not only women, 
but anyone stepping outside of binary gender norms or challenging the naturalness of such 
norms. This will be affected through the use of sex-specific grooming codes and medical gate-
keeping. Its effect will be to establish a hierarchy within the LGBT community, and even with 
the transgender community itself. Those who fit best into a binary system of gender will be the 
most privileged, while those who do not fit are rendered invisible under the law. 
While the decisions in Schroer, Brumby, and Macy promise to provide more people 
coverage than had it before, they will actually offer coverage for less behavior, making the 
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ability of the law to define binary gender performance onto those people stronger. It will create a 
narrow prescribed space for non-conformity, unlike the (potential) open-endedness of Price 
Waterhouse. Transgender and cisgender employees alike will have to conform to the same 
stereotypes.  
This process, of preservation-through-transformation, takes what looks like a huge step 
towards increased protection for the transgender population, and transforms it into something 
that will reinforce societal beliefs about gender.
154
 We can include transgender individuals, but 
they will only be protected so long as they adhere to contemporary gender norms in every other 
way. This is not necessarily done out of any malicious intent. It is likely that the judges deciding 
these cases see themselves as allied with the movement, or at least as tolerant of it. However, 
they are deciding these cases and these questions within legal traditions and from a certain social 
position that predisposes them to certain legal conclusions.
155
 In this way, the changes become as 
small as possible, to fit within prevailing narratives. Just as giving women the right to vote did 
not lead to political equality for women, and criminalizing intimate partner violence did not end 
the violence,
156
 this is a big change, one that has the potential to lead somewhere positive, but 
which is also one that without very conscious interventions, will succeed only to reinforce the 
continued oppression of gender nonconforming persons in a more subtle, but no less effective, 
manner.  
There are a number of potential solutions to this problem. Different legal interpretations, 
the passage of ENDA, instituting state protections rather than depending on federal ones, or 
encouraging companies to institute their own anti-discrimination policies can all help to address 
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the problem. But they are all potentially limited by the same problem of preservation-through-
transformation.  
The real issue is where our focus is, as employers, as judges, and as a country. Because 
we have started from a history of discrimination against individuals based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity, there is an assumption that there is no protection. Judges who believe it 
should stay that way then define why certain people are not entitled to protection. Those who 
believe differently then seek to define a larger group of people who are entitled to protection. 
However, by focusing on who is entitled to protection, we not only create a system that will by 
definition always exclude someone, but we lose sight of the remedial goal of Title VII; the 
elimination of all employment discrimination based on sex (among others).  
The elimination of employment discrimination requires that we actively work to 
challenge and eliminate stereotypes and create workplaces that are inclusive. We must target the 
stereotypes and animus of employers, not get bogged down in what category the employee falls 
into. By refocusing on the intent and animus of the employer, we can more successfully target 
gender stereotypes, regardless of whether they are working against women, men, lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, or transgendered individuals. If it is based on gender, it must be protected by Title VII 
to be successful, regardless of the identity of the person being discriminated against.  
The importance of this sort of shift is ultimately not a hypothetical issue of gender and 
how workplaces participate in its creation, but of the real, lived effects on transgender 
individuals under U.S. law. This population continues to suffer some of the worst outcomes in 
the country, and inhabit the most precarious lives. They are routinely exposed to horrifyingly 
high rates of discrimination and violence. This system will only perpetuate the oppression of one 
of the most oppressed minorities in the country, and will legitimize the oppression of the most 
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vulnerable, those transgender individuals who are not binary-identified. The most vulnerable will 
continue to lack protection and everyone will continue to lack the self-determination to define 
their gender for themselves.  
